

*A Sisyphean Tale: The Pathology of Ethnic Nationalism and the
Pedagogy of Forging Humane Democracies in the Balkans*

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Working Paper QU/GOV/14/2004

August 2004



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I. Introduction

The institutions of the international community (IC)¹ that were placed in charge of implementing the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) have been engaged in the formidable task of forging a strategy to democratize Bosnia. Given that setbacks, such as low refugee and displaced person returns, have dampened the initial euphoria surrounding this strategy, the IC looks to have taken on the role of Sisyphus, the mythical hero who was condemned to spend his days rolling a rock to the top of a hill, only to see the rock roll back down to the bottom. Immersed in a contemporary Sisyphean tale of seemingly futile and hopeless country-building in a post-conflict environment, the IC is determined to overcome the conditions and forces that make their project seem absurd.

Why is the “experiment” in state-making and democracy-building such a daunting task for the IC and for those Bosnians who are partners in this project? If Antony Flew is correct in reasserting the claim that there is both a contingent and necessary relationship between competitive economic arrangements and a democratic politic wrapped in freedom, then perhaps making the difficult transition from a socialist economic system to a capitalist one can be partly to blame for the slow pace of democratic reform in Bosnia.² Economic reforms and expansion of freedoms will improve the quality of material life of many Bosnians, and it may also lead them to become active partners in democracy-building.³ Yet none of this offers a sufficient explanation or a comprehensive remedy for the difficulties that the IC faces in its promotion of democratization.

The problems at the institutional level deserve the consideration that they have received and continue to receive, but theorists and practitioners alike have paid

insufficient attention to explaining the importance of issues that arise at the personal and interpersonal level. One recent exception is the work of Sumantra Bose. Bose places the nationalist fervor and disenchantment of Bosnians against the powers of liberal internationalism exhibited by the IC's strong interventionism.⁴ It is a dynamic relationship, one in which the identities, actions, and interactions of the various parties can adversely affect one another. As he sees it, the problem is between the Bosnians and the representatives of the IC. The leaders of the three Bosnian national groups and the IC, however, have pointed their fingers at everyone except themselves.

In this paper I explore, first, the notion of personal and group identity in terms of ethnicity and nationalism, and the pathology that ethnic nationalism poses to democratization in Bosnia. Second, I discuss the pedagogy of forging humane democracies in light of the IC's liberal internationalism, including the top-down institutional reform and the bottom-up development at the personal and interpersonal level. I also integrate insights from the literature on identity, trust, nationalism, and democratization, and suggest that intercultural education be used for broadening how Bosnians and representatives of the IC understand each other.

II. Identity, Ethnic Nationalism, and Democratization in Bosnia

It is not difficult to understand why representatives of the IC as well as members of the Bosnian community, well-intentioned or otherwise, see the democratization project as meeting solid resistance by groups of individuals who are passionate about their nationalist leanings. The rhetoric, the slogans, the symbolism that create tension and that often incite violence between members of different ethnic groups are the most noticeable signs of obstructionism. When rhetoric and action are instantiated in ethnic political parties, the result is an increasing rate of fragmentation that strengthens peoples' ties with their own ethnic groupings rather than with the society as a whole.⁵ If democracy is ever to take hold in Bosnia, a strong sense of trust must exist between

individuals of the different ethnic groups, for it is only through sufficient trust that people will choose cohesiveness, inclusiveness, and fraternity rather than noncohesiveness, exclusiveness, and animosity.⁶ By defining “trust” inter-ethnically “as one’s belief that ethnic others on average have sufficient commitment to peace and coexistence,” it becomes clear that trust is certainly an important feature of democratization in a multi-ethnic and post-conflict country like Bosnia.⁷ For Bosnians to reach popular sovereignty, more and more of them must view the ethnic Other as friend rather than foe. Given that trust is highly interpersonal, the groundwork for such change must be forged by altering how the notions of identity, ethnic nationalism, and democratization are configured in our conceptual framework.

When we talk about personal identity, we are talking about the identity of persons, that is, human beings.⁸ Although humans are similar to animals insofar as they both exercise a “minimal” agency or activity that creates the means by which to satisfy their desires and to accomplish their ends, humans differ from animals insofar as they are beings of *praxis*. Paulo Freire describes this distinction as follows:

Animals do not consider the world; they are immersed in it. In contrast, men emerge from the world, objectify it, and in so doing can understand it and transform it with their labor.

But men’s activity consists of action and reflection: it is praxis; it is transformation of the world. And as praxis, it requires theory to illuminate it. Men’s activity is theory and practice; it is reflection and action.⁹

Human beings, thus, have agency in a “maximal” sense insofar as they “understand and transform” the world rather than simply being active in it.

Furthermore, personal identity involves “self-interpretation.” According to Charles Taylor, “human beings are self-interpreting subject.”¹⁰ To make sense of the claim that humans are “world transformers,” we need to acknowledge that our desires and ends are those of subjects who are connected with the world in which they live. To understand the world and to engage in this transformational process, we must

understand ourselves in terms of personally selected means and ends. Part of a person's identity is precisely the understanding that he has of himself.

This understanding, however, must take into account the fact that the world is inhabited by other world transformers. Consequently, others play a significant role in identity formation. The psychoanalyst R.D. Laing explains this point in the following way:

Even an account of one person cannot afford to forget that each person is always *acting* upon others and *acted upon* by others. The others are there also. No one acts or experiences in a vacuum. The person whom we describe, and over whom we theorize, *is not the only agent in his 'world'*. How he perceives and acts towards the others, how they perceive and act towards him, how he perceives them as perceiving him, how they perceive him as perceiving them, are all aspects of 'the situation'.... All 'identities' require an other: some other in and through a relationship with whom self-identity is actualized.¹¹

Taylor also emphasizes this need for others:

My discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it out of isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others...My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.¹²

A fact that supports the importance of the Other for self-identity is that people are intense social beings, who have a desire for recognition and affirmation that is as important for human survival as food, clothing, and shelter.¹³ As the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin indicates:

It is not only that my material life depends upon interaction with other men, or that I am what I am as a result of social forces, but that some, perhaps all, of my ideas about myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social identity, are intelligible only in terms of the social network in which I am...an element.... The lack of freedom about which men or groups complain amounts, as often as not, to the lack of proper recognition....¹⁴

Framed in these terms, the role that others play in identity formation is of the utmost importance.

The fact that an individual acquires an identity as he understands and transforms the world and that a person's identity is formed in the presence of the Other, may suggest that personal identities are determined by the world, as well as by an individual's facticity and social relations. This explanation, however, fails to capture the true complexity of personal identity in three ways.

First, each individual does not simply have *an* identity, but rather possesses a multitude of identities, each of which may be invoked privately and/or publicly as the dominant one in any given situation. Take, for instance, a young woman in her 20s. She is not simply female, but someone who possesses other identities that may include being a university student and a poet. Depending on the situation, she may not choose to use her female identity to her advantage, but may instead highlight the fact that she is a poet. These are just a few of the selves of the greater "plurality of selves" that she can manifest.

Second, how an individual typically relates to other persons is not simply as one individual to another, though that is sometimes the case, but as a member of a particular group that is said to be defined by a single dominant property or by a cluster of dominant properties to another member of that same group or to a member of another group that is said to be defined by a different dominant property or cluster of properties. For instance, some of us may identify ourselves as members of groups that are defined in certain ways and that go by labels like "men," "women," "adolescents," "elderly," "Bosniak," "Croat," or "Serb." These gender, age, and ethno-national labels are often at work in much of our speaking and writing, and are sometimes evidenced in what is called the "politics of difference."

Relating personal identity to social group differentiation in essential or relational terms does raise difficult issues. Iris Marion Young has examined some of these problems as they pertain to the "string of beads" theory of identity.¹⁵ According to this

view, a group is defined in terms of a set of essential properties that constitute its identity as a group. Consequently, a person who is said to belong to a particular ethnic group does so because that individual possesses the necessary properties. Of course, to begin to identify that ethnic group requires that we have in mind the essential properties that are associated with being a member of that group. However, given that ethnic groups are more or less discrete and are groups that are aware of and in contact with members of other ethnic groups, group identities need to be defined in relation to members of other groups.¹⁶ So to identify the group referred to as Bosniaks means not only enumerating the essential properties of being Bosniak, such as language, custom, or religion, but also being able to enumerate the essential properties of being Croat and Serb.

There are further problems that are ontological as well as political. As Young so astutely notes, (1) experience informs us that sometimes persons who do not possess the necessary properties of a particular group are nevertheless identified as such by others or identify themselves with the group; (2) persons sometimes deny that the possession of the essential properties of a particular group are significant for their identity; (3) even though individuals have the properties that it takes to be members of a group, this does not mean that they all have similar interests and agree on the means to promote their interests; and (4) the essentialist view does not acknowledge that each of us has a plurality of selves, which in this context means that social groups cut across other social groups (e.g., the group "Bosniak" is differentiated in terms of gender and party affiliation).¹⁷ In addition, a rigid conceptualization of social group differentiation creates a political difficulty insofar as differences are emphasized and similarities made irrelevant or dismissed, thereby encouraging a politics of difference, which creates and sustains conflict and parochialism.¹⁸

Third, personal identity is self-created rather than determined by the world, by a person's facticity, and/or by one's social relations. The fact that the world has a physical dimension that imposes certain constraints and allows for certain possibilities should not be overlooked. The fact that there are landmines in pastures, for instance, does pose a problem to farmers and their families, as well as those urban dwellers who rely on farmers for their food. Yet even these features do not so much determine as influence peoples' identities because people choose not only the meaning that they bestow on the fact that there are landmines but also how they will relate to such a threat.

Similarly, a person's facticity and group membership are not relations of identity, if identity is understood as that which is determined by one's facticity or group membership.¹⁹ A person's facticity, such as age and gender, reflects a set of constraints and possibilities, but persons choose what their age means to them, e.g., whether they are proud of being in their twilight years and look forward to diminished responsibilities or fearful that others will take advantage of them and so seek less and less contact with those who are younger.²⁰ Likewise, a person's relation to a particular group is not one of identity because persons create their own identity, though not under conditions that they choose themselves. We are all born into a situation—"thrown into the world" of history, meaning, relationships, and things—but we are agents, meaning that we take those constraints and possibilities that condition our lives to a certain extent and make something of them in our own way.²¹

Others who discuss identity have also captured this view, although in slightly different terms. Jonathan Glover refers to it as "self-creation," i.e., identity understood *qua* artifact rather than *qua* given. Such a process of self-creation is in some ways similar to how a novelist tells a coherent story about a character of his.²² A character moves through the novel working through a set of constraints and possibilities. Likewise,

the “story we create about ourselves, partly by what we do and partly by how we edit and narrate the story of our past, is central to our sense of our own identity.”²³

The explanatory power and moral significance of persons creating their own identities also arises in how Nenad Miscevic distinguishes “the mere brute fact” of being born into a particular ethno-national group from the “endorsed” identity.²⁴ Although Miscevic has argued well against the claim that a national identity is necessary for personal identity, it remains true that national or ethnic identity is an important part of many peoples’ “plurality of selves.”²⁵

The distinction is an important one because even though a person who speaks Serbo-Croatian and uses the Cyrillic alphabet may be identified by members of the Bosniak community as a Serb, he may nevertheless be unaware of his Serb belonging. The fact that a person is born into a Serb household is an important causal factor in conditioning that person to acquire Serb ethnicity, though it in no way signals proof of identity until that person “endorses” it. In this act of endorsement, a person “identifies” with an ethnic, cultural, or national community, which need not be “factual.” A Croat orphan raised as a Serb by a Serb family, completely unaware of his factual ethnic belonging, can identify with being a Serb, although he is not one in the brute-factual sense.²⁶

To identify with nationality N means not only that one ascribes N to oneself, i.e., believes that he is a member of that national or ethnic community, but that this endorsement is taken to be an effective force in one’s character. It helps to explain why the person does the sorts of things that come naturally to him. There is a certain causal efficacy to the feature that he has identified with.²⁷

In addition to this cognitive component of identification, there is a conative component. When nationality is seen as a positive force in one’s life, the person develops deep emotional ties with the nationality and “cares” about its preservation. This

caring for one's nationality becomes quite evident when a person's nationality comes under attack from members of another ethno-national community, an attack that is often taken to be an attack against his person because of the strength of this identification.

Some persons do not give much significance to their ethnic belonging. A person born in Herzegovina of Croat parentage who speaks Serbo-Croatian may primarily identify himself as an entrepreneur or a Bosnian rather than as a Croat. In this case, Croat ethnicity is considered not to be particularly relevant to why he acts in the way that he does.²⁸ Moreover, ethnic identification is situational insofar as a person can behave as an ethnic Croat in some situations and as a Bosnian in others.²⁹ What is important is that a person does not reduce his plurality of selves so that his endorsed ethnic nationalist identity becomes the dominant feature of his personal identity. When such a reduction and substitution do occur, the person can best be characterized as a "nationalist." It is the nationalist who exaggerates the value of his ethnic national belonging so that ethnicity becomes the main support of his identity.³⁰

The ideology of ethnic nationalism arises when there is a collective shift of identity.³¹ Croatian, Serbian, and Bosniak nationalism are all obstructionist to a genuine democracy and an open society. This occurs through the generation of xenophobia and ethnic chauvinism, which threaten a country's stability by "transforming those who are of the 'wrong' identity into second-class citizens, contrary to the notion of rights and liberties understood within a democratic framework."³² Cultural markers are deployed to differentiate the primary or dominant group from others groups, which are taken to be culturally inferior.³³ Certain differences become more pronounced, leading to marginalization, ostracism, and cultural absolutism.³⁴ Instead of granting others the full respect that they deserve, ethnic nationalism de-legitimizes the thinking of members of other ethnic groups. Results such as these work against democraticization because democracy requires a high degree of interaction and cohesiveness, which in turn is

dependent on mutual trust among members of the different ethnic groups. Similarly, the creation of an open society is hampered because the divisiveness of ethnic nationalism undercuts the free association of individuals who respect one another's rights within a legal framework.³⁵

Given the difficulties that ethnic nationalism poses to democratization in countries with a multi-ethnic population, it was long held that democratization would be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in these countries. Bosnia was taken to be no exception.³⁶ However, Bose and others have challenged this view by considering a consociational form of democracy rather than a majoritarian form and by reconsidering how identities are understood.³⁷ Although the first of these points is somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, it must be noted that even Bose acknowledges the difficulties of a consociational democracy, which is based on equality and power-sharing between different groups via their representative elites when it is implemented in deeply divided societies like Bosnia. As Bose notes, consociationalism excludes the recognition of some collective identities and institutionalizes such exclusion, as well as relies on elite representatives of the communities, thus promoting vested interests under the guise of group interests.³⁸ In the end, however, Bose seems to acknowledge that consociationalism may be the best framework for bringing about a democratic Bosnia.³⁹ More important for this paper, however, is the issue of identity.

According to Bose, scholars of nationalism and nationality identity have moved away from the essentialist view of identity and have adopted a constructionist view similar to the one offered in this paper.⁴⁰ This alternative is a realistic view of ethno-national group identities that allows us to "make such identities compatible with democracy in a multi-ethnic framework."⁴¹ The notion of a "plurality of selves" and the possibility of influencing a person to select as his/her dominant political identity the identity of being a Bosnian rather than choosing his/her endorsed ethno-national identity

can aid in creating the conditions of trust so important for the creation and maintenance of an open and democratic society.

III. Pedagogy of Forging Humane Democracies in the Balkans

The debate over how the IC should intervene in Bosnia appears to have been decided upon with the drafting of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Guided by a vision of liberal internationalism and its emphasis on individual autonomy and rights, the IC has settled into Bosnia determined to democratize that former Yugoslav republic. Recognizing it would face obstructionism by ethnic nationalists from each segment of Bosnia's multiethnic population, the IC began its "grand experiment" in democratization as a comprehensive set of peace-building activities ranging from top-down international regulation of elections, institutional development, and economic management to the bottom-up development of political culture through civil society-building.

Over the past few years, however, the IC has intensified its engagement by increasing its powers, particularly through the Office of the High Representative (OHR).⁴² This is understandable, given the divisiveness and polarization that is created by nationalists of all kinds. The OHR, through dismissing elected and appointed officials and imposing policies on institutions that cannot function effectively, has sought to exercise its own brand of democracy on Bosnia and Herzegovina. This strategy follows a logic inherent within democracy: given that democracies need strong cohesion around a common political identity, if there are local representatives who promote ethnic nationalism and who engage in the politics of difference, then national unity must be built by excluding those who cannot or will not adapt to the identity that is indicative of the most inclusive political community and that can serve as a rallying point for national unity.⁴³ In the case of Bosnia, then, the IC must lead the populace to "the promised land" by eliminating from the scene those elements of Bosnian politics that are obstructionist to a wider "Bosnian" identity.

As several elections have shown, however, the vast majority of eligible voters of Bosnia have not rejected nationalist candidates, and have, in effect dismissed the IC's coercive tactics and its message for a moderate politics.⁴⁴ Bose explains it this way:

The contentious, indeed adversarial relationship between the international community and much of Bosnia's political spectrum is therefore, actually, also a contentious and adversarial relationship between the international community and vast segments of the Bosnian electorate.⁴⁵

In short, the IC and its liberal internationalism has been unable to save the Bosnians from themselves.

Bose is correct to question the feasibility of creating something resembling a market democracy in Bosnia if the IC persists in more of the same strategy. All of the top-down reforms, all of the dismantling and rebuilding of institutions, will not be able to sustain democracy without a similar determination to work on the personal and interpersonal level. This is because (1) a crucial aspect of democratization in Bosnia deals with the fostering of mutual trust and the promoting of non-nationalist identities at least as far as the political arena is concerned, and (2) identities are not brute-facts given by the IC but endorsed, created, and chosen by individuals in response to themselves and to their surroundings. The pedagogy that must be employed is one that prompts individuals to seriously consider identities that stem from recognizing the commonalities between "human" beings. Perhaps we can get closer to this recognition by adopting intercultural education as a way to "liberate us from received opinion, the sort of opinion that often divides us along certain ethnic, racial, and religious categories."⁴⁶

The process of identity formation must be promoted in a way that allows people to recognize that the perspective of the Other is often as deserving of respect as is their own. Learning about other cultures allows people "to see themselves in the Other,"

thereby allowing them to empathize with the Other and act in a civically responsible way toward them. Increasing people's contact with narratives from different ethnic, racial, and religious groups promotes a certain vision and feeling of how the world is through the eyes of the Other, whether the Other is Bosniak, Serb, Croat, or a member of the IC. Intercultural education not only involves an exchange of views, but also creates "dialogue," i.e., a "process of genuine *interaction* through which human beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn."⁴⁷

In Bosnia, as elsewhere, conflictual relationships change over time because people think, feel and act differently when they have replaced the "us and them" relationship with a "we" relationship. There are an incorporation of others' views, enlargement of perspectives, and changes in how people interact with one another. As a result, mutual trust that is created between each of the ethnic groups in Bosnia and between them and the IC will allow democratization to proceed more smoothly.

IV. Conclusion

Although there is no single way to bring about democratization in Bosnia, a reliance on institution-building will likely lead to more paralysis and deviciveness. Expressions of solidarity, friendship, and citizenship within multi-ethnic Bosnia must be nurtured through whatever means possible. One way to achieve this goal is by rethinking how identity, trust, and ethnic nationalism relate to democratization in a deeply divided Bosnia.

Endnotes

1. "International community" means Western governments and multilateral institutions that are in some way controlled by those same governments.
2. See Antony Flew, *The Politics of Procrustes: Contradictions of Enforced Equality* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1981), p. 23 and "The Socialist Obsession," in *Sidney Hook: Philosopher of Democracy and Humanism*, ed. Paul Kurtz (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1983), pp. 36-38. For a more indepth discussion of the thesis, see Max Eastman's remarks in Sidney Hook's, *Political Power and Personal Freedom*:

Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights (New York: Criterion Books, 1959); Fredrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1944); and Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1962). Interestingly enough, the converse is also argued. For example, John Keene, in "The Polish Laboratory," *New Left Review* no. 179 (January—February 1990), presents Adam Michnik's view of Poland under martial law: "the architects of martial law failed to see that democracy is a vital precondition of economic reform and prosperity. The formula is straightforward: No free elections and legally guaranteed civil society, no democracy; no democracy, no bread or butter or decent vegetables or meat in the shops" (p. 105).

3. The process of economic development includes expanding peoples' freedoms. For a treatment of this approach to development, see Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). The convergence of political institutions and economies around the model of democratic capitalism is part and parcel of Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, which surfaces in his *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995), pp. 3-4, 356, 358. See also Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

4. Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Susan L. Woodward, "Transitional Elections and the Dilemmas of International Assistance to Bosnia & Herzegovina," in *Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-sponsored Research and Field Project*, ed. S. Riskin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999), p. 9.

5. The fragmentation that can undermine a democracy is discussed by Charles Taylor in *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 112-18.

6. Fukuyama takes what the sociologist James S. Coleman calls "social capital," i.e., "the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations" to be critical to all aspects of social existence, economic as well as political. Social capital is dependent on the degree to which norms and values are shared and the degree to which individual interests are subordinated to collective interests (Fukuyama, *Trust*, p. 10). It is from these shared norms that trust is created, in the presence of which social capital is subsequently generated (*Ibid.*, p. 26). According to Fukuyama, it is "the concept of social capital [that] makes clear why capitalism and democracy are so closely related," for the robustness of a capitalist economy and the efficiency of democratic political institutions require a proclivity for self-organization, which is part and parcel of what social capital is all about (*Ibid.*, pp. 356-57). For a further discussion of social capital, see James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 Supplement (1988): S95-S120.

7. Murat Somer, "Insincere Public Discourse, Inter-Group Trust, and Implications for Democratic Transition: The Yugoslav Meltdown Revisited," *Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development, and Transition* 6 (December 2002): 94. According to Somer, this private trust in ethnic others is dependent on factors such as the effectiveness of state institutions that establish interethnic peace and public discourse that helps to judge the future intentions of ethnic others (*Ibid.*, p. 96). Fukuyama defines "trust" as "the

expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community” (Fukuyama, *Trust*, p. 26).

8. Some philosophers, such as the American neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty in “A World Without Substances or Essences,” in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 51, have questioned the notion of human nature or human essence because of the suspect character of intrinsic properties. Other theorists like the American legal scholar Michael J. Perry in *The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and the American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum in “Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law,” *Harvard Law Review* 107 (1994), pp. 714, 718 and “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion,” *Social Philosophy and Policy* 27 (1996), pp. 27-58, however, have not shied away from referring to the mark of human beings per se.

9. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970), p. 119.

10. Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4.

11. R.D. Laing, *Self and Others* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 66. This requirement of the other in identity formation is referred to by Laing as “complementarity.” See Laing, *Self and Others*, pp. 66-78.

12. Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 231.

13. Peter Gabel, *The Bank Teller and Other Essays on the Politics of Meaning* (San Francisco, Calif.: Acada Books and The New College of California Press, 2000), p. 13. Gabel returns to this idea in the following passage: “each person wants to connect with the others in a life-giving way, to make contact in a way that would produce a feeling of genuine recognition and mutual confirmation. This desire is fundamental to being a social person, and it animates all of us in every moment of our existence” (p. 20).

14. Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 155. Ruth Abbey, in her *Charles Taylor* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 136, notes that Berlin’s analysis of this profound human need for recognition stems from the communitarian view that identity is a “intersubjective phenomenon,” meaning that how I perceive myself is connected to how others perceive me. See also Fukuyama, *Trust*, pp. 6-7 and *The End of History and the Last Man*, particularly Part Three: The Struggle for Recognition, pp. 141-208.

15. Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 89. Young gives credit to Elizabeth V. Spelman for this metaphor. See Spelman, *Inessential Woman* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).

16. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 2d ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 10. In *Blood and Belonging: Journeys to the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993), p. 22, Michael Ignatieff seems to make this same point in his claim that a Croat is someone who is not a Serb, but goes further when he

suggests that a necessary condition for there to be well-defined *national self* ready to be worshiped is the presence of mutual hatred that Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks have for one another. If his latter claim is true, then it places a heavy burden on the IC in the Balkans to undo the stranglehold of those “ancient” and recent hatreds in order to unseat ethnic nationalism.

17. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 88. Mark Granovetter refers to peoples’ embeddedness in a variety of social groups, such as families, neighborhoods, and businesses, within an economic context. See Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Emeddedness,” *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (1985): 481-510.

18. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, pp. 88-89. Young adequately takes care of many of these problems by conceiving social group differentiation in relational terms. In this way, social groups are differentiated on the basis of cultural practices, needs or capacities, and structures of power. Although this view is less rigid, allowing for the plurality of selves, it remains to be seen whether it can adequately deal with the problem of properties or whether it has simply changed terminology, invoking “cultural practice” in place of “celebration of specific holidays.” See *Ibid.*, 90-99.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

20. Jean Paul-Sartre, *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, trans. Bernard Frechtman and Hazel E. Barnes (New York: The Citadel Press, 1965) and *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: The Citadel Press, 1965). For discussions of facticity, see the treatments in Linda A. Bell, *Sartre’s Ethics of Authenticity* (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1989) and George J. Stack, *Sartre’s Philosophy of Social Existence* (Hampshire, England: Warren H. Green, 1992).

21. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 101. In “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in *Multiculutralism*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 155, Kwame Anthony Appiah cuts to the core of agency bounded by constraints and possibilities when he writes that “we make up selves from a tool kit of options made available by our culture and society. We do make choices, but we do not determine the options among which we choose.”

22. Jonathan Glover, “Nations, Identity, and Conflict,” in *The Morality of Nationalism*, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 18.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Nenad Miscevic, “Is National Identity Essential for Personal Identity?” in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Nenad Miscevic (Chicago and LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 2000), p. 243. See also Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 12-13.

25. In “The Moral Psychology of Nationalism,” in *The Morality of Nationalism*, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 83, Avishai Margalit seems to capture this when he writes that “belonging to a national form of life means being within a frame that offers meaning to people’s choice between alternatives, thus enabling them to acquire an identity.”

26. Miscevic, "Is National Identity Essential for Personal Identity?" p. 244. Greenfeld notes that "nationality" and "ethnicity" have become synonymous terms, with national identity being understood by some to be an awareness of possessing certain "primordial" or inherited group properties like language, customs, and territorial association. However, she does not take such objective nationality or ethnicity to be representative of identity because she construes identity to be a matter of perception. In other words, the person must endorse it. See Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, pp. 12-13.
27. Miscevic, "Is National Identity Essential for Personal Identity?" p. 245.
28. Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, p. 13.
29. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, p. 30. In addition, Eriksen believes that ethnic membership must be acknowledged or endorsed by an agent in order for that identity to be socially effective (p. 37).
30. Miscevic, "Is Nationality Identity Essential for Personal Identity?", p. 254.
31. Rory J. Conces, "Unified Pluralism: Fostering Reconciliation and the Demise of Ethnic Nationalism," *Studies in East European Thought* 54 (2002): 285-86.
32. Conces, "Unified Pluralism," p. 286. See also Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 197.
33. Conces, "Unified Pluralism," p. 288. See also Cynthia Cockburn, *The Space between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict* (New York: Zed Books, 1998), p. 34. George Orwell's claim that nationalism classifies people like insects, pigeonholing people into groups that are labeled "good," "bad," and the like, crystallizes the problem that ethnic nationalism poses for country-builders. See Orwell's "Notes on Nationalism," in *The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell*, vol. 3, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York: Harvest, 1968), pp. 362-63.
34. Conces, "Unified Pluralism," p, 288. See also Jean Bethke Elstain, "Nationalism and Self-Determination: The Bosnian Tragedy," in *Religion and Justice in the War Over Bosnia*, ed. G. Scott Davis (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 52.
35. George Soros, *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism* (London: Little, Brown and Co., 2000), p. xxiii. For an expanded discussion of open society, as well as an articulation of the distinction between open and closed society, see George Soros, *Underwriting Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
36. See Thomas Friedman, "Democracy Isn't Happening in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 24 January 2001 and Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972, pp. 92, 186).

37. See Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton*, pp. 42-44 and Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
38. Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton*, pp. 43, 246-52. For detailed discussions of these problems, see Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991); Anne Phillips, *Democracy and Difference* (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); and Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "The Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work in Citizenship Theory," in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. R. Beiner (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1995).
39. As Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds note in *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999), "consociationalism...is the solution when all else fails" (p. 31).
40. Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton*, p. 43.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 7.
43. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Lisa Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 26 and Charles Taylor, "Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?)," in *Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Democracy*, ed. R. Bhargava, A.K. Bagchi, R. Sudarshar (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 138-63. Charles Taylor notes that such exclusionary practices run counter to the idea of popular sovereignty, which is government of all the people. See Taylor, "Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?)" pp. 138-63.
44. Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton*, pp. 7-8.
45. Ibid., 8.
46. Conces, "Unified Pluralism," p. 295. See also Martha C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
47. Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 82.